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Continuing the Lord’s Work and Healing His People: 
A Reply to Professors Lupu and Tuttle 
Mark E. Chopko ∗
One dark side of human behavior is that some adults seek 
gratification of their sexual desires from children and others who are 
vulnerable to these violations. A regrettable part of institutional 
behavior is that, at times, those in charge compound this human 
behavior through inaction or poor judgment. Indeed, institutions 
with special responsibilities for the care of children—schools, social 
service agencies, day-care centers, religious institutions, youth 
organizations, and others—must call this behavior what it is: always 
wrong and violative of the law. Persons who would abuse a child 
have no place in any organization with responsibilities that involve 
the care of children.1 Such conduct rightly deserves condemnation, 
and child-serving institutions may not allow such persons to work in 
them or shield them from prosecution. 
The instant paper by Lupu and Tuttle makes a similar point: 
Religious organizations2 have learned, in some instances the hard 
way, that some persons entrusted with leadership as clergy or 
ministers have abused children.3 Religious organizations may not 
 ∗ General Counsel, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), 
Washington, D.C., and Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.S., 
University of Scranton; J.D., Cornell Law School. The views expressed in these comments are 
the author’s alone and do not necessarily express the views of the Conference of Catholic 
Bishops or any of its bishop members. The author expresses special thanks to Michael Moses, 
Martin Nussbaum, Fred Moore, Von Keetch, and Patrick Schiltz for valuable comments and 
insights. The conference at BYU was held on what would have been my mother’s eighty-first 
birthday. Mom always urged me to do the right thing, no matter what. This Comment is 
dedicated to her. 
 1. Cf. Pope John Paul II, Address to the Cardinals of the United States (Apr. 23, 
2002), at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/2002/april/documents 
/hf_jp-ii_spe_20020423_usa-cardinals_en.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2004). 
 2. “Religious organizations” or “churches” in this Comment means any church, 
synagogue, temple, mosque, or other entity through which individuals gather in community 
for worship. It also encompasses other religious entities in that community such as schools, 
day-care centers, and other activities involving youth. 
 3. Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 
BYU L. REV. 1789, 1790–93. 
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choose to allow a person who they know has abused a child to 
exercise ministry and expect there will be no consequences if the 
person abuses again. For these organizations, education, prevention, 
and effective response should be the hallmarks of policies against 
abuse of children. When harm has been done, an apology is not 
enough—action is required.4
Religious institutions must show that they have learned the 
lessons from failing to protect children adequately. By and large, 
these lessons are seen in policies and programs that both respond to 
abuse and prevent it by educating parents and others about abuse 
before it happens. The results are seen in lowered rates of abuse as 
churches incorporate these policies and programs into action 
mechanisms.5 But, in addition to preventing recurrences of abuse, 
churches must also heal the wound in the faith community caused by 
abuse and inaction.6 To do so requires outreach and reconciliation, 
and often monetary compensation.7
Dean Nicholas Cafardi has written that Americans show their 
displeasure through litigation.8 Using litigation as a yardstick, we are 
an unhappy people. Even though we might pretend otherwise in our 
communities and neighborhoods, the truth is that we do not all just 
“get along.” Lawsuits are filed between neighbors over fences, 
between parents over the conduct of the PTA, and between 
disagreeing Christians over doctrinal matters such as where the 
Truth lies.9 Over the last generation, a number of factors have 
 4. Cf. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CHARTER FOR THE PROTECTION 
OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE, pmbl. (2002), at www.usccb.org/bishops/ 
charter_final.pdf [hereinafter CHARTER]. 
 5. The John Jay Study commissioned by the USCCB provides one such example. See 
JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM OF 
SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS BY CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND DEACONS IN THE UNITED STATES, § 
2.3, at 28, fig. 2.3.1 (2004), at http://www.usccb.org/nrb/johnjaystudy/index.htm 
[hereinafter JOHN JAY STUDY]. In the decades preceding the actions and steps taken in 
Catholic dioceses, the numbers of abuse cases peaked. Id. After the implementation of policies 
and programs in the late 1980s, the rate reported in the 1990s and beyond dropped 
significantly. Id. While the possibility exists that additional cases will be forthcoming, there is a 
correlation between incidence rates and effective action. 
 6. CHARTER, supra note 4. 
 7. See Mark Chopko, Shaping the Church: Overcoming the Twin Challenges of 
Secularization and Scandal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 125 (2003). 
 8. See Nicholas Cafardi, Giving Legal Life to Ex Corde Ecclesiae Norms: Corporate 
Strategies and Practical Difficulties, 25 J.C. & U.L. 751, 765 (1990). 
 9. See Mark Chopko, Emerging Liability Issues in Non-Profit Organisations: An 
Overview, 8 CHARITY L. & PRAC. REV. 17, 18 (2002) (U.K.). 
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converged to make religious organizations more susceptible to suit. 
The expansion of liability theory is one factor that will be dealt with 
below. Another is the demise of charitable immunity generally,10 
which has, in turn, resulted in an increase in insurance and changes 
to the structure of churches.11 Litigation is part of living and working 
in America, including practicing religion. When the subject of 
litigation is harm to children in this society, religious institutions 
have been caught up in a torrent of litigation. 
Litigation over child abuse also mirrors the fact that society has 
lifted up the protection of children and has implemented better 
abuse- and neglect-reporting statutes. Beginning with the first 
mandatory reporting laws in 1974, society, through the law, has 
indicated that children deserve increased protection and attention.12 
The media has translated these legal expectations into greater public 
awareness. Greater numbers of abusive incidents are reported today 
than thirty years ago, and negative attention has resulted in criminal 
and civil litigation. Catholic Church agencies report that about 
4,000 persons claiming to be victims of clergy abuse have come 
forward or been identified, through litigation, to Catholic dioceses 
and orders since 2002.13 Every institution seems to face litigation, 
including churches. 
However, unlike many corporate and business entities, it is 
difficult for religious organizations, whose main purpose is to 
provide for a worshipping community and for those in need of their 
care, to see litigation simply as a “cost of doing business.” In fact, 
 10. Lupu and Tuttle say this is about the loss of the distinctive place of religion. Lupu & 
Tuttle, supra note 3, at 1798. The idea noted there, however, seems to be related more to a 
doctrinal shift on the Supreme Court, opening the “play in the joints,” Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 
397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970), for more government-imposed benefits and detriments. Cf. Locke 
v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). I believe that it is not related to religion losing its distinctive 
perch as much as it reflects the growth of a regulatory government pervading society and 
pushing out other structures. One solution in fact could be a greater pursuit of “charitable 
choice” whereby genuinely religious institutions could choose to participate in public programs 
without losing their distinctiveness. Indeed such distinctiveness is what makes them valued and 
effective partners. But that article waits for another day! 
 11. See Cox v. Thee Evergreen Church, 836 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. 1992). In the course of 
the litigation, the Church incorporated with the intent to minimize future liability. Cox v. 
Thee Evergreen Church, 804 S.W.2d 190, 193 (Tex. App. 1991). 
 12. See generally National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health and Human Services (NCCANCH) (2004), at http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2004). The NCCANCH provides a comprehensive review of the 
problems, the needs, the laws, and the statistics associated with child abuse generally.  
 13. See JOHN JAY STUDY, supra note 5, § 5.2, at fig. 5.2.1. 
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litigation is alien to their works and practices.14 Religious 
organizations serve the poor and needy by feeding the hungry, 
healing the sick, educating children, and comforting the 
brokenhearted. In these works, religious organizations depend on 
the charity of members and others as their primary sources of 
support. Due to the demise of charitable immunity, religious 
organizations also depend very much on insurance if losses occur due 
to the actions or inactions of the organization itself or those who 
minister in and for it. In at least three ways, churches are different 
from other defendants when considering their liability. 
First, churches are generally not wealthy entities. They are 
charities that operate close to the line. Even in hierarchical churches, 
there is no treasure waiting to be spent. For example, more than 
ninety percent of the money collected in Catholic parishes on a 
Sunday morning stays in the parish to pay the bills, serve that 
community, and take care of their needs.15 Based on my experience 
with other religious communities, a similar situation exists within 
other denominations. Religious organizations are, in this regard, 
public charities, very often without cash reserves available when faced 
with a prospect of catastrophic loss. 
Second, most insurance and liability systems, including those 
under which churches operate, presume that actions seeking redress 
for losses will be filed in a time closely related to when the loss 
occurred. Not so in the case of sexual misconduct. Claims filed 
today, by an overwhelming margin, are for (mis)conduct that 
occurred twenty or more years ago.16 The result is liability coverage 
 14. In the fifth chapter of Matthew’s Gospel, Jesus warns his disciples about allowing 
their disputes with their brothers and sisters to stand in the way of fellowship and faith. He 
preaches a peaceful resolution of disputes. Matthew 5:25. In the eighteenth chapter of the 
same gospel, fraternal correction is preferred to litigation. Matthew 18:15–17. When such 
correction fails, the parties are urged to take the dispute to the church for resolution. If the 
offender refuses to reform, the worst possible penalty is applied—the offender is treated as a tax 
collector. Matthew 18:17. See also Paul’s exhortations on nonadversarial resolutions. 1 
Corinthians 6:5. 
 15. See CTR. FOR APPLIED RESEARCH IN THE APOSTOLATE (CARA), INTERNATIONAL 
CATHOLIC STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL DIOCESAN PROFILE 2003, at 9 (2003). 
 16. Many Catholic dioceses reporting their claims experiences have indicated they have 
few claims for any misconduct occurring after about 1990. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese 
of Albany, Diocesan Report: A Historical Accounting of Clergy Sexual Abuse of Minors in the 
Albany Diocese (Dec. 2003), at http://www.rcda.org/HistoricAcct.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 
2004) (stating that two percent of the abuse is charged after 1990); Statement By Most 
Reverend Nicholas Dimarzio, Diocese of Brooklyn, On Clergy Sexual Abuse (Feb. 27, 2004), 
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that is often inadequate or unavailable. Insurance available for these 
claims was often purchased assuming lower rates of recovery when 
settlements of a generation ago would apply.17 No one anticipated a 
spate of hundreds of claims, each seeking a seven- or eight-figure 
recovery, at a time when only a few hundred thousand dollars of 
total insurance was available.18 Additionally, as businesses, insurers 
have treated religious organizations as they would any profit-making 
entity. They have turned away from their duty, denying coverage and 
refusing to defend large numbers of claims when it seemed to save 
the insurers money.19
Third, religious organizations have a special responsibility to heal 
the damage caused by those who have ministered for them. In 
justice, as I have written elsewhere, such claims should be received 
by the church, evaluated by its leadership, and mediated by the 
parties to a fair result.20 A fair result presumes some form of 
compensation to those harmed that does not substantially impair the 
primary works of the religious agency to serve the ongoing human 
needs of a worshiping community.21 When it is not possible to 
balance these demands justly, or when a party insists on resort to 
legal process, religious entities must defend themselves under the 
law, if only to preserve the ability to continue their primary works. 
Plainly, a pastoral approach that a religious organization might prefer 
to follow is far removed from the trial-by-combat that passes for 
litigation in twenty-first-century America. Nonetheless, the primacy 
of the pastoral approach must be the path for religious organizations. 
When the pastoral approach fails to resolve the conflict—and I pray 
it does not fail because of the hardheartedness of any church or its 
representatives—religious organizations must defend themselves in 
at http://www.dioceseofbrooklyn.org/about/abt_bishop_statements_dimarzio.html (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2004) (stating that 24 of 189 cases of abuse occurred after 1990); see also 
JOHN JAY STUDY, supra note 5 (confirming that priest-child abuse occurred mostly in the 
1970s). 
 17. See Patrick Schiltz, The Impact of Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation on Religious Liberty, 
44 B.C. L. REV. 949, 956–57 (2003). 
 18. See Adam Liptak, Abuse Cases Pose Threat to Worship, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
6, 2003, at A3. 
 19. I reserve special criticism for insurance companies, but we are limited on space. 
 20. Chopko, supra note 7, at 150–51 & nn.138–39. 
 21. See id. at 154. 
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courts of law.22 To do so effectively means they must walk the 
difficult path of healing God’s injured people without sacrificing the 
other works of the worshipping community. 
In this brief Comment, I endorse the conclusions reached by 
Lupu and Tuttle and believe their article, if applied by practitioners 
and courts, will add needed strength to the rights of religious 
institutions without sacrificing the rights of those injured by church 
ministers. I write to clarify additional areas in which their analysis 
could be expanded and offer remarks based on how cases are in fact 
litigated against churches, beginning with observations on the proper 
law to apply and which religious entities should be properly named 
and in what circumstances. 
I. CHURCHES ARE NOT ABOVE THE LAW 
Religious organizations operate within the framework of the 
religion clause (or clauses) of the Federal Constitution and applicable 
state constitutions. These robust provisions, described in these 
conference papers, are not exceptions to the rule of law; they are the 
law that must be applied. The suggestion that these rules immunize 
churches wholesale against the consequences of their actions is not 
correct, as discussed below.23 More to this point, however, the 
doctrine of church autonomy is a fundamental part of the law. 
Although that law is well described in these papers,24 I wish to add 
these other notes. 
First, the nature of church autonomy as described in case law 
implicates at least various aspects of the First Amendment: namely, 
 22. In defending themselves, churches must still act like churches. Not every defense or 
every tactic is justified. I have been impressed when churches, victorious in litigation, 
immediately can reach a mediated result to provide healing and compensation. See, e.g., 
ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF PROVIDENCE, ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE 
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION FUNDS AND DIOCESAN CEMETERY OPERATIONS OF THE 
DIOCESE OF PROVIDENCE 2002–2003 (Sept 26, 2003), available at 
http://www.dioceseofprovidence.org/files/ANNUAL_REPORT_2003.pdf; Press Release, 
Diocese of Camden, Settlement Reached in Sexual Abuse Case (March 13, 2003), available at 
http://camdendiocese.org/pdf/Statement-FINAL.pdf. 
 23. See infra Part II.C. 
 24. Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons 
of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 3, at 1789; Perry Dane, 
“Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715. 
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establishment, free exercise, free speech, and free association.25 In 
specific cases, it may also implicate federal equal protection and due 
process protection,26 and parallel provisions in state constitutions 
when they have been interpreted as more protective of religion than 
their federal counterparts.27 Which ones are implicated, and when, 
depends on the circumstances of the case. For example, in litigation 
over the application of contraceptive insurance mandates to Catholic 
agencies, the religion clauses as well as free speech and association 
rights are implicated.28 Usually in tort liability cases, only the religion 
clauses are involved, and even then only narrowly, so long as the 
courts are properly applying tort law, as discussed below. 
Lupu and Tuttle root church autonomy within tort liability cases 
only in the Establishment Clause.29 However, the Free Exercise 
Clause, even after Employment Division v. Smith,30 offers protection 
for the communal and institutional expression of religion.31 The 
religious organization has rights itself, and it is wrong, in every case, 
simply to view the entity as the aggregate of individual expressions.32 
 25. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Religious Organizations, Catholic Charities of 
Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004) (No. S099822), available at 
http://www.usccb.org/ogc/amicuscuriae5.shtml. 
 26. For example, if a regulatory scheme exempted some but not all religious 
organizations from some mandate. 
 27. See, e.g., State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990). 
 28. The California Supreme Court rejected these claims in Catholic Charities of 
Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004). In Catholic Charities, the 
California Supreme Court considered whether a nonprofit public benefit corporation 
associated with the Catholic Church could refuse to cover prescription birth control under its 
health plan on the basis of the Catholic Church’s opposition to the use of birth control. Id. at 
74–75. The court held that the Women’s Contraception Equity Act—which required the 
employer to cover the costs of the medication—was applied neutrally and generally, did not 
discriminate against the Catholic Church, and met both the rational-basis and strict-scrutiny 
constitutional tests. Id. at 94–95. The case conflicts with settled authority in at least two 
respects. First, it fails to recognize that, under the right of church autonomy, government has 
no power to wrest control of a church’s treasury to make it fund, in its own house and within 
its own workforce, private conduct to which the church is religiously and morally opposed. 
Second, the court assumes incorrectly that government can classify religious organizations on 
the basis of which ones are “purely” religious and which are not. 
 29. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 3, at 1795–6, 1805–19. 
 30. 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). The Court cites approvingly the autonomy line of cases 
even as it revises the body of law for free exercise claims of individuals. 
 31. Id. at 876–77; see Brady, supra note 24, at 1677. 
 32. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 n.3 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (observing that “[f]or many 
individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from participation in a larger 
religious community . . . not reducible to a mere aggregation of individuals”). 
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Smith notes these communal aspects of religion and favorably cites 
precedent dealing with associational rights and the autonomy of 
churches.33 Although Smith did undo much of the real protection 
afforded religious individuals, it would be a misreading of this 
seminal case to ignore the favorable treatment of this precedent, 
which represents a vindication of an autonomy rule rooted in free 
exercise.34
Other cases misread Smith’s emphasis on the validity of neutral 
and generally applicable rules in tandem with Jones v. Wolf,35 which 
endorsed a “neutral principles” approach to property cases involving 
churches. Why that reading of Smith is wrong is discussed above. 
Under Wolf, when resort to legal documents can answer property 
questions of title, beneficiary, and ownership, courts are permitted to 
resort to such documents.36 However, in my view, this rule applies in 
property cases in which resort to those documents is routine in other 
nonreligious contexts. Interpreting a will or a deed is not the same as 
interpreting the canon law of a church. Moreover, the Wolf rule 
reflects a “peace at any price” philosophy that emphasizes resolving 
disputes definitively rather than letting them fester in a community. 
Clarity of ownership and the priority of various property rights add 
stability to the law and to a community. Knowing that this approach 
could be applied also encourages churches to anticipate property and 
other conflicts and to plan for them clearly in the legal documents 
through which they hold and administer property. On the other 
hand, courts, though skilled at review of such documents, are 
required by the Constitution to decline a resolution that depends on 
interpreting religious doctrine to answer a disputed question. The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop 
of Manila37 indicates as much when it held that, although courts have 
 33. By referencing the associational aspects of religious expression, the Court expressly 
acknowledges the broader institutional rights. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (citing Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)). 
 34. See also Brady, supra note 24, at 1677. 
 35. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). A federal district court, for example, applied neutral principles 
to a defamation action arising out of religious discipline. See Klagsbrun v. Va’ad Harabonim, 
53 F. Supp. 2d 732, 738 n.3 (D.N.J. 1999) (applying New Jersey law that relies on Wolf.). 
 36. 443 U.S. at 603–04. 
 37. 280 U.S. 1 (1929). 
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the authority to interpret trusts,38 a trust clause rooted in religious 
doctrine is beyond the judicial ken.39
The Gonzalez rule, not the Wolf rule, should normally apply in 
tort litigation involving churches. Certainly courts are familiar with 
the growth and application of tort rules, but those rules may, in 
specific cases and for specific claims, lead courts unwittingly (one 
hopes) into policing the internal affairs of religious organizations, 
and thus possibly violating the Constitution.40
II. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERSECTIONS 
A. Finding the Right Defendant 
The discussion of subject matter jurisdiction by the Supreme 
Court in Gonzalez is an important point of departure in defining the 
ways in which the tort liabilities of religious organizations should be 
imposed and the criteria by which they are measured. The balance of 
this commentary notes particular places where the constitutional 
rights of religious organizations could be infringed through the 
liability system. It begins in deciding whether the religious entity is a 
proper defendant. As has been described elsewhere, whether a 
particular religious entity is properly chargeable is a question of 
 38. The Court held, summarily, that it had personal and subject matter jurisdiction. 
Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16. The Court also noted, “[t]here is jurisdiction of the subject matter; 
for the petitioner’s claim is, in substance, that he is entitled to relief sought as the beneficiary 
of a trust.” Id. That the trust property was in the hands of the Archbishop “affects not the 
jurisdiction of the court, but the terms of the trust.” Id. (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 679, 714, 729 (1879)). 
 39. Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16. The plaintiff.’s expert in Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, a 
Lutheran, had no trouble opining on what a reasonable Episcopal bishop should do. 863 P.2d 
310, 325–26 (Colo. 1993). It is precisely this sort of judicial conduct that Gonzalez precludes. 
Jones v. Wolf notes that resort to documents to resolve a dispute includes more than the deed 
or the will but could also include the statutes and bylaws of the church, its book of order or 
internal law, and other documents. If those documents lead to the need to resolve a religious 
question or interpret religious law, the court is to defer. 443 U.S. at 604 (citing Serbian 
Eastern Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)). 
 40. For example, the Florida Supreme Court in Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 
2002), uses secular employment rhetoric to describe a negligent hiring claim it applies to a 
religious entity (e.g., “unsuitability,” “employment”), rather than considering the broader 
implications of its rule. Id. at 361–62; see also Moses, 863 P.2d at 320 (citing Bishop and 
Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 102 (Colo. 1986)). 
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liability law.41 Either the defendant did or did not have actual 
competence over the matter disputed in the lawsuit. Finding this 
defendant, and excluding those improperly named, is not normally 
unconstitutional. Only when parties, attempting to increase the 
likelihood of recovery, seek to force courts to rewrite a church’s 
polity or engage in other judicial excesses is the Constitution 
implicated. 
For example, the Conference of Catholic Bishops has been 
joined in a lawsuit arising out of the wrongful death of a college-age 
young adult. Other defendants include the parish where the accident 
happened and the diocese in which the parish is located.42 It is 
alleged that the young man, plaintiff.’s decedent, consumed alcohol 
offered by the parish priest, became drunk, and fell to his death 
when the attic floor on which be walked broke beneath him.43 On 
these facts, plaintiffs charge that the defendants knew the priest had 
served alcohol to persons under twenty-one.44 All defendants are 
charged with having fraudulently concealed the priest’s conduct (i.e., 
the improper use of alcohol) allegedly pursuant to a master plan 
(administered by the Conference) to hide priestly misconduct.45 In 
Roman Catholic polity, only a bishop and diocese have responsibility 
for the supervision of a parish priest; they are the only proper 
defendants here. No one else, not the parish, not the Conference, 
not the pope, may exercise daily supervision over him as that term is 
used in civil discourse.46 Even if every defendant had knowledge of 
this priest’s behavior, the only defendants empowered to act are the 
bishop and the diocese. As such, no other defendant can be 
maintained in the lawsuit for failure to act.47 Yet, because plaintiff.’s 
 41. Mark Chopko, Stating Claims Against Religious Institutions, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 
1100, 1105 (2003) (noting the body charged with liability must possess actual, not merely the 
potential for, authority over the cause of the dispute). 
 42. See Amended Complaint, Gaines v. Krawczyk (E.D. Pa. 2003) (No. 03-CV-05257). 
 43. Id. ¶¶ 12–19. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Plaintiffs make the not-so-novel claim that the diocesan bishop is charged with 
knowledge of his underlings and the uniquely novel claim that his “knowledge” may be 
attributed to the USCCB because he is a corporate member. Id. ¶¶ 4, 14–19. 
 46. See 1983 CODE c.273; NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, 344–
46 (John P. Beal et al. eds., 2000) (discussing the special obligation of obedience to diocesan 
bishop); see also Dewaard v. United Methodist Church, 793 So. 2d 1038, 1040–41 (Fla. App. 
2001) (dismissing a nonsupervising local church). 
 47. In N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 998 P.2d 592, 600–01 (Okla. 1999), the 
court rejected liability in a national religious body absent some showing that the entity even 
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counsel believes his likelihood of recovery will increase with more 
defendants, no defendant will be voluntarily dismissed. In these 
circumstances, the defendants against whom liability may not lie 
must expend resources to defend themselves.48 And to seek a 
settlement from parties with no legitimate liability is unjust. 
In this example, if the plaintiffs persist in their theory that all 
share in the knowledge available to the dioceses and that together, 
under a “master plan,” all are liable for any failure of supervision, the 
court would, in effect, be asked to disregard the structure of the 
Catholic Church and substitute the plaintiff.’s polity (as pleaded in 
the complaint and memoranda). In my view, that result would 
offend the Constitution. The case law is clear that churches have the 
right to organize, administer, and govern themselves according to 
their own internal law.49 The courts cannot act in any way to 
instigate themselves in the polity.50 The question of constitutionality, 
however, should not even arise at the outset unless the usual rules of 
liability and corporate law are disregarded,51 and the plaintiff’s 
counsel persists in propounding, and a court adopts, this legal error. 
As noted above, religious organizations are not above the law of 
the state. They have liability exposure for the just debts and damages 
they create or cause.52 But the liability is for the debts and damages 
they directly cause and cannot be compounded by the debts and 
damages created or caused by another religious organization that is 
ecclesially and civilly separate (unless there is some basis in law or fact 
for vicarious liability). Having “Catholic” in the name does not make 
knew about the malfeasing minister. The proper supervisor in that polity was the presbytery, 
not the National Assembly. 
 48. On November 18, 2004, the district court dismissed the counts of the complaint 
against the USCCB for failure to state a claim. USCCB had been named only in conspiracy 
and fraud claims based on the knowledge of the bishop (who is a corporate member as noted 
in note 45). The central holding of the court was that, under Pennsylvania law, the religious 
beliefs of the plaintiff’s decedent could not form a fiduciary relationship with a priest (without 
some express undertaking). Without a legally enforceable special relationship, the civil 
conspiracy and fraud claims (against all defendants including USCCB) were found without 
merit. 
 49. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 
94, 116 (1952). 
 50. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976). 
 51. See Chopko, supra note 41, at 1097. 
 52. See Chopko, Derivative Liability, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CHURCHES: 
AN INQUIRY INTO THE IMPACT OF LEGAL STRUCTURES ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Craig B. 
Mousin ed., forthcoming 2005). 
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them all defendants. For example, each Catholic diocese, each 
Lutheran Synod, each Mahayana temple (and the list could go on) is 
ecclesially, and thus should be civilly, separate from every other. 
Misconduct in Boston is not recoverable in Boise.53 Part of the law 
under which religious organizations operate presumes that corporate 
separations will be honored by civil courts even when private litigants 
plead for a different polity than the one chosen by the church. 
Imploding a church structure of separate civil entities, absent fraud,54 
because a plaintiff pleads that “they’re all in it together” violates first 
principles of corporation law. Forcing a religious entity to answer for 
the torts of another over whom it lacks the civil and ecclesial power 
to control also violates the Constitution since it results in a court 
rewriting the polity of a church.55 Ordinarily, by operation of 
corporate law, such a result is avoided. If a litigant insists otherwise, 
he should lose under the Constitution as well. The Constitution 
forbids the state to organize a Church. That barrier applies de facto 
and post factum through tort liability. 
B. Claims Barred 
Whether the Constitution precludes the adjudication of a matter 
ab initio or comes into the lawsuit as an affirmative defense at some 
later stage in the litigation is disputed among practitioners and in the 
courts. Professors Lupu and Tuttle do not advert to this procedural 
and substantive matter in their paper. Some courts have ruled that 
the Constitution bars consideration of a case at the outset and 
should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.56 Other 
courts believe the matter is not barred from the court’s judicial 
power but might implicate a constitutional matter on which the 
court should abstain during the trial.57 I believe the matter is more 
 53. For example, in Presbyterian Church, 998 P.2d 592, recovery was demanded of all 
Presbyterian entities and individuals. The harm occurred in Kansas and Oklahoma within two 
Presbyteries, which were the governance agencies for the polity. Id. at 594–97. 
 54. See Roman Catholic Archbishop of S.F. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Cal. 
App. 1971) (no alter ego liability in “Catholic” agencies). Fraud in setting up corporations or 
in their operation might offer a basis for piercing the corporate veil. 
 55. Chopko, supra note 41, at 1103. 
 56. See, e.g., Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 790 (Wis. 1995), 
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1116 (1996). 
 57. Kelly v. Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192, 197, 203 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting the specific 
issue and holding no preclusive barrier to litigation) (citing Parella v. Retirement Bd. of the 
R.I. Employees Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
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complex, turning on the ecclesiastical status of the persons bringing 
the claim, the nature of the claimed action, or both. 
In brief, claims brought by ministers to litigate the terms and 
conditions of their ministry are barred, and courts lack subject matter 
jurisdiction to entertain such claims under the Constitution. This 
class of litigation implicates the “ministry exception” described 
elsewhere.58
Such cases—that is, all the claims raised in these cases—should 
be subject to a motion to dismiss challenging the judicial power of 
the court to hear them. Where the complaint raises facts that the 
plaintiff demands to be taken as true for purposes of ruling on a 
dismissal motion—for example, that the person is not a minister or 
exercising ministry—a religious organization should still file motions 
attacking the judicial competence of the court to entertain the suit 
and support them with affidavits and other evidence disputing the 
facts.59 In such a case, the jurisdiction of a court must be decided 
before the court evaluates the merits of the claims.60 It is a question 
of law for the judge, not a question of fact for the jury.61 The burden 
of proof is on the one asserting (not disputing) jurisdiction; that is, 
the plaintiff.62 The so-called “ministry exception” cases are 
susceptible to this approach.63
Cases brought by church members to adjudicate their ecclesial 
status (for example, to challenge an excommunication)64 or contest 
some aspect of church discipline (for example, public excoriation for 
sinful behavior)65 should receive similar treatment. They should be 
 58. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 3, at 1804, 1810–13. 
 59. See Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese, 773 N.E.2d 929, 938 (Mass. 2002) (holding that a 
lower court’s acceptance of a plaintiff’s allegations as true in ruling on the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss was incorrect and that, because defendants’ motion was supported by affidavits, the 
burden to prove jurisdiction was on the plaintiff). 
 60. See, e.g., Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Indus., Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558–59 
(9th Cir. 1987) (demonstrating that the lower court’s acceptance of plaintiff.’s allegations as 
true in ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss was incorrect and that the burden to prove 
jurisdiction was on the plaintiff because defendants’ motion was supported by affidavits). 
 61. Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 537–38 (1995). 
 62. See Trentacosta, 813 F.2d at 1559. 
 63. See Hiles, 773 N.E.2d at 938. 
 64. See, e.g., O’Conner v. Diocese of Honolulu, 885 P.2d 361 (Haw. 1994) 
(challenging an excommunication). 
 65. See Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 776 (Okla. 1989) 
(addressing a church’s public excoriation for sinful behavior). There are, of course, limits to 
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dismissed on motion, one that addresses the true nature of the 
underlying dispute and inability of the civil courts to decide religious 
questions. These cases reach the very heart of the church autonomy 
doctrine found in Watson v. Jones.66 When a people agree to be 
bound together in a religious community, that community is 
accepted, warts and all. Dissent over doctrine or resentment over 
practices does not provide a basis for civil litigation.67
The last class of cases are brought by nonministers and do not 
involve the adjudication of ecclesial status.68 These cases include 
disputes over the misconduct of ministers and the misstep of 
ecclesiastical leadership. Whether these cases are dismissed on motion 
or whether the disputes move to consideration of the merits 
depends—in my view—on the nature of the claims. Lupu and Tuttle 
have accurately noted that claims for negligent ordination,69 failure 
to defrock,70 clergy malpractice,71 and most fiduciary duty claims72 
should be barred on constitutional grounds. These claims should be 
subject to dismissal on motion challenging the subject matter 
competence of the civil court to hear such a claim.73
Claims of fiduciary duty against ministers and churches rooted in 
religious beliefs and ideations should fail.74 Fiduciary claims have 
discipline that results in injury. See Candy H. v. Redemption Ranch, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 505 
(M.D. Ala. 1983). 
 66. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1872) (“[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of 
faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church 
judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions 
as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.”). 
 67. Id. at 727–29; see also Roman Catholic Bishop v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
399, 406 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a vow of celibacy is a religious decision that does not 
create a civil duty). 
 68. I exclude from analysis the regulatory invasion cases. See, e.g., Catholic Charities of 
Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004). 
 69. See Hogan v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, No. 02–1296, slip op. at 14 
(Mass. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18, 2003), at http://www.socialaw.com/superior/supFeb03xx.htm. 
 70. See id. at 16. 
 71. See Chopko, supra note 41, at 1112 (citing cases). 
 72. Id. at 1119–24. 
 73. In some instances there may be a religious forum to hear a claimed injury. Or, there 
are cognizable civil grounds, as described herein. 
 74. A fiduciary duty may, however, arise between a minister and a congregant in a 
nonreligious context; for instance, a fiduciary duty can be established by a minister agreeing to 
look after a trust fund for an aged relative or through specific promises made in counseling. Cf. 
Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church, No. 2003-CA-00123-SCT, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1224, at 
*21–22. 
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their origin in the law of trusts.75 One of the innovations of modern 
law has been to apply fiduciary duty concepts to certain professional 
relationships: attorney-client, physician-patient, and psychotherapist-
patient. Ordinarily a fiduciary duty case involves an entrustment of 
money or a professional relationship—in short, some undertaking 
that the state can constitutionally regulate.76 Of course, no one 
argues that the state has any business regulating the relationship 
between a church and its flock or that it can constitutionally do so.77 
Yet that is exactly what happens when, as in Martinelli v. Bridgeport 
Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.,78 a court imposes fiduciary 
obligations upon church officers. Martinelli is particularly disturbing 
because, pressed to its logical conclusion, every bishop is a fiduciary 
of his coreligionists, based on who he is as bishop and not what he 
does with particular persons—an absurd proposition.79 Indeed, 
bishops do not pick the members of their congregation; all are 
welcome for worship and instruction.80 Ordinarily it is the other way 
around; that is, people choose a church and may remain in a church 
short of conduct grave enough to cause the church affirmatively to 
excommunicate them, a rare penalty. A bishop cannot personally 
know and be a fiduciary for each and every member of his diocese 
based solely on membership and participation in ceremonies.
To this list of claims that should be constitutionally barred, I 
would add claims of “canonical agency,” denominational liability, 
and a host of “evil empire” claims, such as RICO. Claims of 
canonical agency and denominational liability seek to leverage 
 75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
625–26 (6th ed. 1990) (traditionally resting on entrustment of property to others). 
 76. For example, property managers, bank officers, executors, and receivers can all be 
regulated. Secular relationships of trust and confidence such as attorney-client, physician-
patient, etc. can also be regulated in their outward manifestations. But an attorney is not 
regulated in the content of her speech, or because law is special and unique, but because of the 
express undertaking between two people. While an attorney might be a fiduciary if she 
undertook an obligation rooted in trust, her law firm would not ordinarily be presumed also to 
have such a relationship, without more. 
 77. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 3, at 1809–10. 
 78. 196 F.3d 409, 430–31 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 79. See id. at 429. 
 80. A case that is particularly instructive is Package v. Holy See, No. 86-C-222, slip. op. 
at 6 (N.H. Super. Nov. 30, 1988), in which the pope was alleged to be responsible for a car 
crash caused by a monk in New Hampshire. The pope did not select the monk for any purpose 
that could give rise to a duty to third parties. The monk was, for liability purposes with respect 
to the pope, a congregant. Id. The followers choose to follow the leader.  
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church doctrine into a tool for expanding civil damages. For 
example, “canonical agency” rests on the premise that a cleric is 
always “on duty” and that no part of his or her time is ever personal. 
Everything done is in service to the church, and religious superiors 
are always on the hook for supervision and liability. Such a theory 
was advanced more than twenty-five years ago in a California case 
arising out of a traffic accident.81 The proposition has been rejected 
by courts as a matter of agency (no agent is always on duty).82 
However, because the theory rests on supposed religious doctrine 
(where else would the notion of ministry be found), it also violates 
the Constitution.83 At a minimum, this theory requires courts to 
evaluate the degree and depth of religious supervision according to 
religious, not secular, canons.84
Similarly, denominational liability would need to rest on religious 
doctrine, if at all. For example, in N.H. v. Presbyterian Church,85 
plaintiffs claimed every church agency (and member), in concert with 
the Presbyterian national assembly, was liable for the sexual 
misconduct of a minister. That minister served in two presbyteries, 
which were the proper “supervising” entities. The theory that all 
Presbyterian Church entities were liable for the negligence of one or 
two regional presbyteries rested on the doctrine of the church’s 
Book of Order that the actions of one are the actions of all.86 This 
phrase, however, is an exhortation to religious solidarity. Plaintiffs 
 81. Stevens v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Fresno, 123 Cal. Rptr. 171, 175–77 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1975). 
 82. See Ambrosio v. Price, 495 F. Supp. 381, 384 (D. Neb. 1979) (holding that a 
church could not be held liable for an accident involving a clergy member because the accident 
occurred during a personal trip); Brillhart v. Scheier, 758 P.2d 219, 221 (Kan. 1988) (holding 
“that a pastor’s day-to-day activities were within his own discretion and control”).  
 83. See Roman Catholic Bishop v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1996). 
 84. For example, the NEW COMMENTARY TO THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 
46, at 346, indicates that bishops lack supervision over clerics on “personal time.” No person is 
always “on duty” with no “time off.” But to raise the issue means to offer a competing 
canonical opinion and a court must decide which one is correct, something it constitutionally 
may not do. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
 85. 998 P.2d 592, 597 (Okla. 1999) (the claim rested on a denomination-wide charge); 
see supra note 84. 
 86. Petition, Hosey v. Presbyterian Church, at ¶¶ IV, 3–5; V; I–K (Sept. 30, 1997). 
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could not constitutionally mutate the phrase to “the negligence of 
one is the negligence of all.”87
Courts here can avoid the constitutional thicket by recognizing 
and disposing of the extreme liability theory on ordinary grounds—
failure to state a claim.88 A similar result awaits more exotic theories, 
such as supposed RICO violations because of sexual misconduct. 
Sexual assault is not an enumerated predicate act necessary for a 
successful RICO claim.89 Additionally, a search of the four corners of 
a religious “enterprise” invariably results in a constitutional 
problem,90 for as we know, the Constitution is sometimes violated by 
“the very process of inquiry.”91
C. Claims Narrowed 
What happens to claims by nonministers not challenging ecclesial 
status or predicating liability on some religious duty is a matter of 
debate. Some jurisdictions bar these claims altogether; some allow 
them.92 Sometimes the federal and state courts have reached opposite 
conclusions about whether the federal Constitution bars particular 
claims.93 There is no order in this universe, and the results can 
 87. Indeed such a result would impose liability on persons and agencies far removed 
from the source of the claimed harm, misfeasance by those actually responsible for supervision 
in that polity. The trial court in N.H. disposed of a claim on constitutional grounds. A more 
wide-ranging critique of assertions of denominational liability is in Mark Chopko, Ascending 
Liability of Religious Entities for the Actions of Others, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADV. 289, 337–41 
(1993). 
 88. See N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 998 P.2d 592. An amicus brief of 
religious entities urged dismissal and noted the more traditional flaws in the pleading. Brief of 
Amici Curiae of Baptist General Conference et al., N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 998 
P.2d 592 (Okla. 1999) (No. 92953) (dismissed because no allegation of knowledge in 
defendant church leadership). 
 89. For example, Professor G. Robert Blakey, of the Notre Dame Law School and the 
drafter of RICO, has stated that a sexual assault is not a “predicate act.” Robert Blakey, 
Address at the Boston College Law School Symposium (Apr. 4, 2003) (on file with author); 
see also Eckler v. Gen. Council of the Assemblies of God, 784 S.W.2d 935, 941 (Tex. App. 
1990). 
 90. See Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1139 
(D. Mass. 1982) (explaining that courts usually interpret regulatory statutes narrowly to 
prevent encroachment on free exercise principles). 
 91. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979). 
 92. Compare Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 790 (Wis. 1995), 
with Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 361 (Fla. 2002). 
 93. For example, in New York, a lawsuit in the federal courts is barred. See Ehrens v. 
Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod, 269 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d, No. 03-
9118, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 20568 (2d Cir. Sept. 20, 2004) (per curiam). However, the 
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sometimes be explained away by the extreme nature of a claim or the 
means by which the Constitution is necessarily employed as a 
defense.94 What seems clear at this point is that extremism in 
litigation by either party is rarely rewarded, in part for the reasons 
suggested by Professors Lupu and Tuttle,95 but more often, I think, 
because of justice. Absent an ordinary barrier to a claim, such as a 
statute of limitations, it is counterintuitive for a trial judge to decide 
a case by a preclusive rule that, in effect, immunizes repeated, 
criminal behavior.96 Such a rule would also be difficult to square with 
constitutional history, which has always provided a means for society 
to prevent dangerous practices97 and to protect the public health98 
and the welfare of children99 from actions rooted in religious 
teaching. Even the seminal case Cantwell v. Connecticut,100 which 
incorporated free exercise protections against the states and punished 
a municipal licensing scheme as a prior restraint, allows room for 
government to prosecute frauds based on “religion.”101
same types of claims may be maintained in state courts. See Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). The same principles apply in Colorado. Compare Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. 
Supp. 2d 1246, 1250 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that allowing plaintiff.’s negligent hiring claim 
would violate the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses), with Moses v. Episcopal Dioceses 
of Colo., 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993) (holding that the First Amendment does not bar claims 
of negligent hiring and supervision against churches). In Rhode Island, the opposite occurs. 
Compare Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 77 (D.R.I. 1997), with Heroux v. Carpentier, 
No. CA PC 92-5807, 1998 WL 388298, at *9 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 1998). 
 94. Advocates are sometimes allowed to simply assert without the obligation to 
affirmatively prove. Plainly there is a difference between moving to dismiss on constitutional 
grounds with a memorandum and a “speaking motion” with affidavits and exhibits. Hiles v. 
Episcopal Diocese, 773 N.E.2d 929, 938 (Mass. 2002). In the latter situation, the plaintiff 
should lose unless she proves, in the same exacting way, why a court may hear the case or the 
claim. Bryce v. Episcopal Church in Diocese of Colo., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1334 (D. Colo. 
2000), aff’d, 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 95. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 3, at 1855–56, 1857–58. 
 96. See Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and The Decline of 
Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 245–46 (2000) (noting that state judges were less 
likely to decide on constitutional principles in favor of a church). 
 97. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (implying that the 
government has the power to regulate certain religious practices, such as human sacrifice). 
 98. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (holding that the 
government may regulate activity and behavior for the common comfort, health, and 
prosperity of all). 
 99. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (noting that the state has an 
interest in children’s well-being). 
 100. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 101. Id. at 306. 
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But Cantwell still requires that the conduct pose a “clear and 
present danger” to a “substantial” interest related to public health, 
safety, or order before the state is allowed to regulate the individual 
or entity.102 A lesser standard could allow for the possibility that the 
state, through its agencies and courts, would punish and confine 
religious actors wherever and however it deems necessary.103 
Professors Lupu and Tuttle recognize this danger, for example, in 
their useful critique of the line of fiduciary duty cases.104 The 
reprehensible nature of sex crimes against children and the seeming 
inaction of religious authorities and others a generation ago are 
especially ripe targets for judges and juries applying today’s 
expectations, standards, and law to yesterday’s behavior. The 
Constitution does not allow the state to punish the church but does 
allow for principled means to compensate victims for clear injuries.105
Professors Lupu and Tuttle wrestle with and reject the more 
common claims made against religious organizations as difficult to 
square with the Constitution’s text.106 My experience with these 
types of cases and claims validates their ending point. As Professors 
Lupu and Tuttle decide, ordinary negligence claims offer too much 
“play in the joints,” permitting excessive judicial action that, in the 
zeal for compensation, allows recovery by any means, including 
causes and evidentiary bases that infringe upon the constitutional 
rule of law. Applying a test approximating the “actual malice” 
standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan107 is a useful way for 
courts to proceed.108 Such a process would (a) be based on actual 
knowledge, not supposition or guesswork; (b) permit recovery in 
tort for harm caused by repeat offenders; and (c) have a mechanism 
whereby claims are evaluated by judges, not juries.109 Each has merit. 
 102. Id. at 311. 
 103. See id. at 308 (finding that, in the absence of a high barrier, there is a danger a 
state’s rule will sweep too broadly into religion). 
 104. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 3, at 1844–45. 
 105. As such, I consider punitive damages levied against churches to be unconstitutional. 
 106. Id. at 1869–71. 
 107. 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (holding that a public official, to recover for defamation, 
must prove actual malice, meaning that the defaming statement was made “with knowledge 
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”). 
 108. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 3, at 1861. In particular, the paper notes a possibility 
that liability will “require religious entities to restructure themselves to satisfy a state-imposed 
vision of the ‘good’ or well-ordered religion.” Id. at 1834. 
 109. Id. at 1866–67, 1870–71. 
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The closest comparable standard in current case law is the 
“intentional failure to supervise” standard of Gibson v. Brewster110 
and Gray v. Ward.111 in Missouri. This standard is also applied by the 
Rhode Island state courts112 and is reflected in an earlier decision in 
Ohio, Byrd v. Faber.113 While these cases do not set the same 
standard proposed by Professors Lupu and Tuttle, they are an 
improvement on the application of ordinary negligence claims. 
The constitutional problems with ordinary negligence claims are 
manifold. For example, negligent supervision traditionally requires a 
claimant to show that an employer knew, or should have known, of a 
risk that an employee would cause harm while performing the 
employer’s work and should have prevented the harm through better 
supervision. The employer’s standard of care is based on what other 
“reasonable employers” would, in theory, do when confronted with 
the same information. These are secular standards based on 
commercial employment in which what “should be known” is 
related to a specific set of commercial tasks. Ministry, however, is not 
secular employment, but the result of a complex theology based on 
call and vocation. 
An illustration of the problematic application of an ordinary 
negligence claim to a religious organization is the Florida Supreme 
Court’s recent allowance of negligent hiring and supervision claims 
based on a very thin legal analysis. The court in Malicki v. Doe.114 
read constitutional concerns out of the case by stating that free 
exercise concerns are implicated only when the underlying 
misconduct is based on religious principles. If that were sufficient to 
dispose of the Free Exercise Clause, there would be no such thing as 
 110. 952 S.W.2d 239, 248 (Mo. 1997) (holding that “a cause of action for intentional 
failure to supervise clergy is stated if (1) a supervisor (or supervisors) exists, (2) the supervisor 
(or supervisors) knew that harm was certain or substantially certain to result, (3) the supervisor 
(or supervisors) disregarded this known risk, (4) the supervisor’s inaction caused damage, and 
(5) the other requirements of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 317 are met”). 
 111. 950 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Mo. 1997) (holding that the trial court erred in dismissing a 
petitioner’s claim of intentional failure to supervise clergy). 
 112. See, e.g., Heroux v. Carpentier, No. CA PC 92-5807, 1998 WL 388298, at *10 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 1998). 
 113. Byrd v. Faber requires detailed pleading of the factual basis on which the tort claim 
against a church rests. 565 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ohio 1991). This rule displaces the ordinary 
notice pleading in which parties might guess what discovery might bring.  
 114. 814 So. 2d 347, 360–61 (Fla. 2002). 
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a ministerial exception.115 Additionally, the court misses the point. 
The question is not, as the court thought, whether the individual 
wrongdoer can be charged with a crime or a tort, but whether a 
religious institution, and its hierarchy, is civilly responsible for such 
wrongdoing. These are separate questions when liability is based on 
fault.116  
As Professors Lupu and Tuttle correctly point out, the question 
of whether the institution is liable invariably raises questions about 
allocations of responsibility within a religious organization.117 Such 
ecclesial questions may not be answered in precisely the same way 
from one religious denomination to another. Plainly, the answer may 
also be very different from that of a secular employer.118 Universal 
application of a liability principle only to hierarchical churches 
exempts congregational churches, and this facially implicates 
antiestablishment principles. Universal application of secular norms 
violates free exercise–church autonomy principles. 
Moreover, under the “should have known” part of the equation, 
how information “should be known” is itself problematic. In one 
case, a plaintiff claimed that he repeatedly confessed his violation by 
his priest to other priests, and that these actions constituted 
knowledge in the defendant bishop and diocese, notwithstanding 
that confession is sacramentally secret and confessors may not 
divulge what is heard.119 When information is private, personal or 
pastoral, one would dispute whether this information is available to 
the institution120 and what its probative value is. Sending this dispute 
to a jury, however, would seem to provoke recovery unless the 
evidence presented by the institution was overwhelming. Recovery in 
 115. Most, if not all, of the ministry exception cases involve alleged discrimination at 
odds with the teaching of the religious body. Consistency with doctrine is not the key to these 
cases, but the level of state interference in a religious function is. See, e.g., Gellington v. 
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 116. Nonetheless, Malicki, 814 So. 2d 347, 361, and its companion Doe v. Evans, 814 
So. 2d 370, 374 (Fla. 2002), routinely conflate the categories in reaching for a result. 
 117. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 3, at 1883–84. 
 118. See Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 692 A.2d 441, 444–45 (Me. 1997). 
 119. See Koenig v. Lambert, 527 N.W.2d 903, 906 (S.D. 1995) (holding that, since the 
plaintiff claimed he confessed his abuse to seventeen priests, there was “material fact” about 
diocesan knowledge). Cf. NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 46, 
at 983. 
 120. See, e.g., Rivers v. Poisson, 761 A.2d 232, 235–36 (R.I. 2000); Osborne v. Payne, 
31 S.W.3d 911 (Ky. 2000). 
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tort in such cases is allowed, but the prospect of abusive or multiple 
recoveries should be mitigated. Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s judge-
only system avoids the possibility of jury bias.121  
In other cases, “should have known” plainly means “should have 
anticipated”; for example, a court has held that a nursery volunteer 
might have been a victim of abuse and therefore might have 
abused.122 In other instances, the evidence of “should have known” 
seems an indictment of the inadequacy of the religious system of 
pastoral clergy, or their selection and training.123 In such cases, how 
the religious organization or its insurer “should have known” is not 
clear.  
The result in Gibson,124 like the test advocated by Lupu and 
Tuttle, mitigates these difficulties. There is no liability without 
antecedent knowledge (not guesswork or hindsight).125 Such 
knowledge must be directly related to the work or service of the 
minister and the negligence charged.126 A religious “employer” could 
ignore that knowledge at its peril, and in such clear cases, a failure to 
remove an abusive cleric is difficult to explain or justify.127
I would not, however, extend this area of law to other claims 
sounding in “employment.”128 First, such an extension would seem 
 121. The possibility of jury bias is compounded in liability regimes in which juries can 
decide the extent to which a perpetrator’s actions were personal or employer-motivated. Lupu 
& Tuttle, supra note 3, at 1855; see also Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1166–67 (Or. 
1999). In other instances, such as in regulation for example, the state is barred from deciding 
such questions based on the degree of “religiosity.” Compare NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of 
Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979), with Montrose Christian Schools Corp. v. Walsh, 770 A.2d 111, 
128–29 (Md. 2001). 
 122. See Broderick v. King’s Way Assembly of God Church, 808 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 
1991) (noting that the center failed to ask a volunteer whether she was ever abused). 
 123. See Schiltz, supra note 17, at 960, 967–69. 
 124.  952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997). 
 125. See id. at 248. 
 126. Consider, for example, the cases cited in Schiltz, supra note 17, at 960–62, and in 
Chopko, supra note 41, at 1117 n.112. 
 127. It is quite a different situation when a minister is involved as the alleged tortfeasor, 
than when the alleged guilty party is a congregant who is only worshipping in a community. 
Some cases have asserted negligent supervision claims against churches when one congregant 
assaults another, based on an asserted “should have known” standard. To assert a congregation 
must supervise congregants for all potential dangers would revolutionize the law and pervert 
religion. No more “All Are Welcome” signs in front of churches. They would be replaced with 
membership forms laden with background information questions and a release. Such a 
development would be dangerous for the law of torts by mutating employment law into a 
custodial form of liability law, and a sad day for churches. 
 128. Contra Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 3, at 1866. 
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to be duplicative. A court that provides one avenue of recovery, in 
my view, provides the only avenue a claimant needs. A jury system 
allowing multiple torts (on the same facts) as the basis for a verdict 
allows the same conduct to be punished several times. A colorable 
claim of abuse, responded to with proper compensation, is an 
adequate remedy for a victim. Second, claims like negligent hiring 
and negligent retention invariably ignore that the task being “hired” 
for is ministry.129 Malicki, for example, allowed a negligent hiring 
claim based on whether what was known or should be known 
renders a person unsuitable for employment.130 However, in these 
cases, “employment” is ministry and a person’s suitability for 
ministry is a religious question. One cannot make a decision about a 
person’s suitability for employment without also making decisions 
about the nature of the employment. Similar arguments could be 
made with respect to “retention” claims.131 Such claims could and 
should be barred and subject to a motion to dismiss. 
Supervision claims are not necessarily so easily disposed of. The 
Constitution is implicated in the evidence, the knowledge, and “the 
very process of inquiry.”132 Raising the bar from negligence to 
intention or, as Professors Lupu and Tuttle suggest, from torts to 
constitutional defamation, avoids most, if not all, the constitutional 
problems of other approaches. It also avoids the injustice of seeming 
to immunize repeated criminal behavior or institutional misfeasance 
against recovery. No person is beyond the law. Neither are religious 
organizations. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Religious institutions are in a real bind. On the one hand, a 
failure to remove those who injure children has created the risk of 
liability for the failure to act. On the other hand, the vagaries of the 
liability system, built on secular employment models and on secular 
reasonable business standards, are not accommodating to religious 
systems. Tort liability essentially regulates the conduct of business by 
 129. See Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 794 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997). Additionally, for the myriad of claims amassed by plaintiffs, see Hogan v. 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, No. 02-1296, slip op. at 14 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18, 
2003), at http://www.socialaw.com/superior/supFeb03xx.htm. 
 130. Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 360–62 (2002). 
 131. See Chopko, supra note 41, at 1116. 
 132. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
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the financial disincentive of large liability awards; however, it is not 
the role of the state to force similar changes to religious behavior 
inside religious institutions, absent exigent circumstances. These 
circumstances, such as when there is a clear and present danger to a 
substantial state interest, warrant a different result. 
No one would argue that a state cannot award damages for 
physical abuse even if carried out in pursuit of religious teaching.133 
Few should complain when the liability system compensates 
individuals injured by the repeated criminal misconduct of clergy, 
especially when that behavior is in fact known to leaders who were in 
a position to stop it. But the test is intentionality, not negligence. In 
these circumstances, the Constitution would not normally bar a 
court from jurisdiction to hear a case setting forth such intentional 
acts. 
The same cannot be said about other kinds of tort recovery. 
Actions based on fiduciary duty or negligent hiring and retention, 
like claims for clergy misconduct, all invite the courts to pretend they 
are not policing relationships inside religious bodies while doing just 
that. If the state may not define in advance what kinds of relations 
religious leaders must have with clergy, or the relations religious 
people must have with their churches, the state cannot define these 
matters after the fact through the tort system. 
Finally, churches need the freedom to be churches. They do best 
when they have the freedom to heal the injuries caused by their 
ministers. But they must do so consistent with their primary 
responsibility to the worshipping community and those in need. The 
destruction of a church through the tort system is no answer. 
Neither is the loss of religious freedom through fear of liability. 
Churches are obliged to continue their works while healing the 
people.  
 133. See, e.g., Candy H. v. Redemption Ranch Inc., 563 F. Supp. 505, 511 (M.D. Ala. 
1983). 
